Turkish authorities have agreed to tackle this problem under international pressure within the context of Turkey's bid to join the European Union. The official perspective has shifted in recent years from denying this phenomenon and ignoring its consequences to an ambiguous policy of regulation.
In this essay, 1 we argue that this regulation takes place within the framework of a depoliticized policy discourse centered on "regional development" which is taking shape in the course of the interactions between the Turkish government, the EU and the UN. We say that this discourse is depoliticized since it disentangles the phenomenon of internal displacement from the Kurdish issue 2 as a political problem and instead links it to a "technical" agenda of development. In this process, issues of accountability, justice and reconciliation are tacitly circumvented not only by the government, but by the EU and the UN as well.
In order to situate displacement in Turkey within a broader context, we first discuss the global IDP crisis and international responses to it. We raise two sets of issues in this context: first, the tensions between international action and sovereignty in the context of the emerging international IDP regime, and second, the pitfalls of humanitarian assistance programs in opening the way for the construction of new forms of power relations regarding displaced groups. Then, a retrospective account of displacement in southeastern Turkey during the 1990s is given. Official nonacknowledgement and hence the lack of programs of assistance to displaced villagers have carried internal displacement to the plane of urban poverty and destitution. In the wake of the military victory over the PKK in 1998, the government formally allowed displaced people to return to their villages, albeit with restrictions. However, we maintain that it was Turkey's candidacy to the EU, granted in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, which initiated the political process resulting in a gradual policy change by the government. The visit of the UN Special Representative for IDPs to Turkey in 2002 represents a milestone after which the government began to collaborate with the UN on internal displacement in Turkey. Another major development was Turkey's quest to secure the European Commission's approval for starting accession negotiations in 2004, during which a compensation bill was passed by the parliament and a governmentinitiated study on IDPs was launched. After analyzing the unfolding of this process, we discuss the shortcomings of the emerging policies. We argue that the policy discourse that is in formation is geared more towards regulating the consequences of displacement and less towards bringing a lasting solution to it. Therefore, in the absence of efforts for a durable solution to the Kurdish issue, the fate of IDPs will continue to depend on the contingent political situation in the Southeast where armed clashes have recently revived.
The global problem of internal displacement
The forced internal displacement of people has been described as one of the most pressing global crises of the twenty-first century.
3 After the end of the Cold War, a drastic increase in ethnic conflict and intra-state wars has led to the massive displacement of people within their countries. While in 1982, 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) were counted in 11 countries, today, an estimated 25 million IDPs live uprooted in 49 countries: "In 1993 and 1994 alone, internal conflicts worldwide forced an estimated 10,000 persons a day to flee their homes." 4 In the meantime, the number of refugees has declined to less then 12 million worldwide. Almost all continents are affected: the largest number of IDPs can be found in Africa, with over 13 million. This is followed by 3-4 million in Asia, 3-4 million in South America, 3 million in Europe and over 2 million in the Middle East.
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Because IDPs flee within their country and do not cross a state border, they are not considered refugees from a legal perspective and hence remain outside of the protection system of the international refugee regime. While a binding legal definition is still absent for IDPs, the "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" describe them as ...persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or humanmade disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. 6 There is no binding law or a powerful international agency dedicated to IDPs' plight since the international state system regards internal displacement as an internal problem of the respective states. The conventional principle of sovereignty assigns responsibility for the protection of IDPs to nation-states, and only with the states' consent can international organizations intervene with relief efforts. This is highly paradoxical since it is often the very states themselves which have deliberately caused IDPs to leave their homes. The expectation that states would protect their IDPs and/or effectively cooperate with international organizations to improve the situation of IDPs has so far not been fulfilled. Rather, the fact that most cases of internal displacement prove to be protracted over many years shows that governments rarely do take up their responsibility towards IDPs. Since many of the post Cold War internal wars were caused by national identity crises or ethnic conflicts, IDPs are often not seen as victims by the government but as partisans of the conflict. Especially when IDPs belong to a national minority or a marginalized group peripheral to the dominant identity group, IDPs are often seen as enemies rather than as citizens to be protected. 7 Trapped in the paradox of sovereignty, IDPs thus become one of the most vulnerable groups in the international state system lacking effective domestic and international protection. The conventional notion of sovereignty has been challenged in academic and policy circles in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent increase in intra-state wars. 8 Spurred by "Operation Provide 6 Cohen and Deng, Masses in Flight, 305. 7 Roberta Cohen, "Sovereignty as Responsibility: The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" (paper presented at the Calcutta Research Group and the Refugee Studies Centre at Jadavpur University, December 2003). 8 One important contribution to the debate was pushed forward by the Special Representative for IDPs, Francis Deng. In his concept of "sovereignty as responsibility," Deng offers a positive interpretation of sovereignty where states should "invite or at least welcome international assistance to complement national efforts." This formulation is particularly relevant for the IDP problem. He argues that if a state cannot provide protection for its citizens, then it is its duty to allow international Comfort" in Iraq 1991, these discussions evolved mainly around the issue of humanitarian interventions. 9 The 1990s were marked by a rapid increase in the number of humanitarian interventions, which sometimes took the plight of displaced persons as their main motive for international action.
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Yet sharp criticisms towards the apparent contingency of the decision for military intervention on behalf of displaced people -mostly depending on the geopolitical interests of powerful states -have accompanied the increase in interventions. 11 While some cases of displacement led to military interventions, others remained unnoticed by the international community. This divergence in the international reactions to the situation of IDPs illustrates that their fate depends not only on the actions of their state, but to a significant degree on the actions of the international community as well. Thus, the problem of internal displacement is as much a problem for national governments as it is for the international community. Forced Migration Review, no. 4 (1999) . The divergent positions of western powers on the Iraqi refugee crisis in 1991 on one hand and Kurdish internal displacement in Turkey on the other illustrate the prioritizing of geopolitical interests over humanitarian concerns for IDPs. However, a further discussion of this crucial issue is beyond the scope of this essay.
International responses to internal displacement
Representative on Internal Displacement (RSG). While the appointment reflected an acknowledgement of the global crisis of internal displacement, the mandate was very limited with its temporary, voluntary, part-time form without any allocation of funds. The most notable achievement of the mandate was the development of a normative framework for the protection of IDPs: the "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement." The Guiding Principles are a set of non-binding norms based on refugee, human rights and humanitarian law. They aim to provide protection guidelines to be followed by political authorities as well as NGOs and humanitarian organizations working with IDPs. Consisting of 30 items, the Guiding Principles cover all phases of internal displacement, ranging from the right not to be arbitrarily displaced, to standards for protection during displacement and standards for protection during return, resettlement and reintegration. As members of the Deng team emphasize, the goal of the principles are "not to create a privileged status for IDPs but rather to ensure that, in a given situation, they, like others, would be protected and their unique needs would be acknowledged and addressed." 12 Hence the ultimate purpose of the Guiding Principles is to respond to the particular needs of IDPs and to guarantee their human rights.
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The Guiding Principles were developed upon the request of the UN Commission of Human Rights in 1996 to prepare an "appropriate framework" for the protection of IDPs. As the Deng team was quite aware of, the demand was not for a "legal" or "binding" framework, but an "appropriate" one.
14 This wording of the request demonstrates quite well the unease of the UN regarding the issue: while on one hand, the need for an immediate response to the global crisis of internal displacement has been apparent, at the same time the cooperation of UN member states has been rather half-hearted, given that displacement is often caused by states themselves. The general reluctance of member states to advance restrictions on state sovereignty contributed to the unwillingness for further institutionalization of an IDP regime. This resulted in the preference for a "soft regime" in which the Guiding Principles are endorsed by the UN, yet no separate agency has been set up to implement them. The priority of powerful Western states to contain the flow of asylumseekers has often led to generous funding for humanitarian aid in conflictzones, yet so far it has not been accompanied by assertive and consistent policies for the protection of IDPs. Hence, this dependency on the geopolitical interests of the seemingly neutral "international community" makes IDPs a highly vulnerable group at the global scale.
Humanitarianism as a form of regulation
The criticism towards the international community is not limited to the absence of a binding regime for the protection of and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced groups. Parallel to this, there has also emerged a vocabulary about conflictrelated problems such as "post-conflict reconstruction," "rehabilitation" and "capacity building." Critical scholarship on forced migration argues that such policy-oriented terms have a link to the "discourse of development"
25 not only in assuming the possibility of linear solutions to problems (informed by modernization theory), but also in terms of their emphasis on poverty alleviation, employment creation, reconstruction, etc. Therefore, policies informed by the discourse of development tend to depoliticize the consequences of armed conflicts since they lay emphasis on "technical" issues rather than political struggles, demands and claims. In a nutshell, international agencies create an object by first defining the problem and then identifying the best methods of policy intervention. In this way, the problem and its suggested solution constitute a single entity, or part of the same discourse, and hence they are rendered integral parts of the same power relations.
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When viewed through the prism of critical studies on forced migration, a set of issues specific to IDPs are brought to the fore: international organizations often assume that IDPs are homogeneous groups with identical problems and needs. A related policy priority of international agencies is the swift "return, resettlement and reintegration" of IDPs. What is behind this policy priority is the view that displacement is a single, temporal phenomenon rather than a social process protracted over many years. Related to the previous point, IDPs are often assumed to want to go back home.
How can we assess the Turkish case in light of critical forced migration studies? In some respects, the above-mentioned criticisms seem to be only and Ethnography," Acta Geographica (forthcoming). 24 Liisa H. Malkki, "Refugees and Exile: From 'Refugee Studies' to the National Order of Things,"
Annual Review of Anthropology, no. 24 (1995) . 25 Here, we are alluding to the notion of "development discourse" as discussed by Arturo Escobar. He describes the development discourse as having created an "apparatus for producing knowledge about, and exercising power over, the Third World" (Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9.). Escobar refers to the entire corpus of theories, strategies and policies produced under the rubric of development studies in the postwar period. The sense in which we use "development discourse" in the context of forced migration studies refers to a much more limited discursive practice. 26 Sorensen, "Anthropological Contributions to Forced Migration Studies." remotely relevant to the Turkish case because of certain particularities. Since the state did not allow any international assistance in the immediate aftermath of the displacement of Kurds, it was out of question for international organizations to exercise control over IDPs through humanitarian practices. Put differently, IDPs' problems were entirely left to the initiative of the sovereign nation-state. But even in the absence of international intervention, the state gradually began to frame IDP-related issues within a developmental language. Moreover, the recently emerging collaboration among Turkey, the UN and the EU on the issue of internal displacement is bolstering the regulation of post-displacement problems through a discourse of development. Thus, in light of the critical literature on forced migration, one of our goals is to describe how the developmental policy discourse is being reinforced in the course of diplomatic cooperation. Another of our aims is to lay bare the problems occasioned by this policy discourse: For instance, can we make generalizations about the conditions and problems of Kurdish IDPs? Can policies with a developmental agenda fully address IDPs' expectations and aspirations? And hence, can currently implemented policies solve the IDP problem in a durable way? However, the setting in which this discourse is being constructed cannot be grasped before we identify the particularities of the Turkish case. For almost a decade, Turkey's policy of denial and neglect was accompanied by silence and inaction on the part of the international community. While forced displacement in the surrounding region triggered strong international reactions by western countries and the UN, the displacement of Kurds in Turkey went diplomatically relatively unnoticed. It was only in the course of Turkey's efforts to secure the EU's approval for starting accession negotiations that international pressure became enforceable and the government began a dialogue with international agencies on its problem of internal displacement. But so far, the policy discourse that is taking shape under international guidance promotes a depoliticized approach that disentangles forced displacement from its causes, namely the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
The internal displacement of Kurds in Turkey
During the 1990s, several hundred thousand people were internally displaced in the Kurdish-populated southeastern and eastern provinces of Turkey in the course of the "low intensity conflict" between Turkish security forces and Kurdish militants. 27 A parliamentary investigation report in 1998 put the figure of the internally displaced at 378,335, based Göç-Der, 1999 . 32 The parliament report stated that the numbers it provided did not include partially evacuated villages and it conceded that the official figures might have understated the actual extent of the evicted population. See, "Boflalt›lan Yerleflim Birimleri." Moreover the "official" figure does not include f.orced migration from town centers, but only from rural settlements. In fact, towns such as Lice (Diyarbak›r), Cizre and its provincial center fi›rnak were largely depopulated after intense military operations between 1992 and 1996. For journalistic accounts of these military operations, see for 1990s, the population of regional provincial centers such as Diyarbak›r and Van had swollen with rural migrants and IDPs. The bulk of the migration from the southeast was directed towards ‹çel, Adana and Antalya in the south, ‹stanbul and Kocaeli in the north, and ‹zmir and Manisa in the west as well as the capital Ankara.
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In a number of cases, local authorities provided IDPs with some humanitarian aid and settled some of them in vacant or newly built housing, but overwhelmingly, IDPs were left to fend for themselves once they were evicted. 34 The accounts of forced migrants and documentation by human rights groups indicate that often the only help available for IDPs was from their kin in the towns and cities where they arrived. Since no population census was undertaken between 1990 and 2000 and since state authorities refused to admit that security forces had evacuated more than a few villages, our knowledge of the extent of population displacement and how it happened is descriptive at best. The accounts given by IDPs almost invariably mention ultimatums by the gendarme to leave their villages within a short period of time (a few hours to several days). The reason of the ultimatums was either the villagers' refusal to become village guards 35 -armed and paid by the state -and/or the accusation that they aided and abetted PKK militants. 36 Houses, sheep pens, stored grains, fields and trees were often burnt during or soon after the eviction of the residents, either by the gendarmes or by accompanying village guards, to make return to the villages impossible. 37 In subsequent months and years, some villagers petitioned 
Internal displacement as a sustained violation of citizenship rights
Since forced displacement in the southeast took place without official acknowledgement and in contravention of the constitutional protection of life, property, domicile, and freedom of travel, it stripped IDPs of some of their citizenship rights 47 and produced lasting consequences. The most distinctive characteristic of the displacement of Kurds during the 1990s was its implementation beyond the rule of law, a point repeatedly underlined in the parliament report. 48 In fact, the 1987 decree-law (no. 2003) . 47 According to the parliament report, constitutional rights violated during and after the village evacuations included the principle of equality before the law, the right to protect and develop one's life, the sanctity of private and family life, the sanctity of domicile, the right to property, and the principle of protection of basic rights and freedoms ("Boflalt›lan Yerleflim Birimleri"). 48 This extralegality (hukukd›fl›l›k) was also mentioned during the deliberations on the parliament 285) that initiated emergency rule in the region, and which lasted until 2002, authorized the State of Emergency Region Governor (Ola¤anüstü Hal Bölge Valisi) to evacuate villages and hamlets and to resettle their population according to security needs; but this authority was never utilized during the whole period. 49 A comparison of recent displacement with the forced resettlement of Kurdish tribes who had taken part in the Dersim uprising of the 1930s highlights the extralegality of the eviction of villagers during the 1990s. In the former case, population displacement was carried out in the context of a special resettlement law; people were resettled in designated regions in central and western Anatolia and were given land and other economic entitlements. 50 But in the 1990s, village evacuations were carried out without leaving a paper trail behind.
More broadly, Kurdish displacement should be considered within the context of the widespread breaches of the rule of law in the provinces under emergency rule. Internal displacement in the southeast has created one of the most sustained and widespread (and still ongoing) violations of human rights in Turkey in recent years, although it has not received much public attention until recently. 51 This situation gave Turkey's internal displacement problem its particular characteristics. Thus, by evicting several hundred thousand people from their rural homes, the security forces to a great extent displaced the Kurdish issue from its territorial base in the southeast onto the plane of urban poverty and destitution in metropolises in western Turkey. The social problems that displacement triggered and the political mode in which these problems are addressed today lend support to our argument. In metropolitan Diyarbak›r, whose population grew to more than 800,000 after the peak of the evacuations (from about 380,000 in 1990), 56 new districts mushroomed to house the recent wave of migrants. On one hand, a rent economy was created through the building of "modern" shantytowns with multiple floors but without any legal permits or inspection. On the other hand, the inadequacy of the city's infrastructure and its schools and hospitals in the face of a rapid influx of people created serious problems. A shortage of classrooms and primary healthcare facilities are still among Diyarbak›r's most important problems.
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Meanwhile, infectious diseases (e.g., typhoid fever and cholera) and infant mortality increased to alarming levels in Diyarbak›r in the second half of the 1990s, creating a public health disaster exacerbated by poverty, poor housing, and the inadequacy of piped water and sewage systems. 58 It is impossible to retrospectively demonstrate that any of these problems were caused by forced displacement per se. However, testimonies of public and NGO officials and IDPs alike suggest that the juxtaposition of already weak urban and healthcare services neglected throughout the course of the conflict, a stagnant urban economy and the sudden influx of forced and "voluntary" migrants have shaped Diyarbak›r's current problems. In ‹stanbul, which continues to be a magnet for migration from all over the country, internally displaced Kurds are not recognized as a distinct group and, therefore, their specific problems are not addressed by local politicians and authorities. But some scholarly studies suggest strong links between the new urban poverty and forced migration from the southeast. Abrupt dispossession of land, coupled with the already less welcoming structure of the urban housing and labor markets in the 1990s, put internally displaced Kurds at the bottom of the barrel among the new urbanites, 59 making these families more likely to resort to having their children contribute to household income. For instance, two studies indicate that in both Ankara and ‹stanbul, the children of displaced Kurds are significant groups among children working on streets. 60 More than a decade after it took place, it is difficult to quantitatively gauge the impact of forced displacement on urban poverty in large metropolises. The dynamism of the population movements triggered by the armed conflict adds to the difficulty of such a task. As we explained above, forced migration in the southeast was not limited to the evacuation of villages, but it also included displacement due to perceptions of insecurity, intimidation, threats and so on. Furthermore, the ravages of the internal war also triggered economic migration and urban out-migration from the region. Moreover, once families moved to regional urban centers such as Diyarbak›r, Batman and Van, many of them started to engage in seasonal migration to coastal regions as agricultural laborers. And lastly, in many cases, teenage sons (and sometimes daughters) moved further west to ‹stanbul, ‹zmir and Antalya in search of jobs in informal manufacturing and services. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the state itself perceives a link between recent migration from the southeast and burgeoning urban problems such that recently formulated policies to cope with the consequences of internal displacement are couched in the language of development. 61 59 Sema Erder, ‹stanbul'a Bir Kent Kondu: Ümraniye (‹stanbul: ‹letiflim, 1996) , Sema Erder, "Köysüz 'Köylü' Göçü," Görüfl, no. 34 (1998) 
Internal displacement framed as a problem of development
In 1998, a "Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project" (RVRP) was adopted by the government to meet the demands for return once PKK activities declined. 62 Under this program, villagers who applied to the governor's office for returning to their village would be given in-kind aid (construction materials and/or animals) if there were no security hindrances to return to the village. Sometimes, the funds were used for repairing a village's roads, electricity poles or water pumps if a significant number of villagers were returning. 63 The RVRP, which was administered by the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) Authority in some provinces and the Rural Services Directorate in others, prioritized the concentration of settlements (yerleflim yerlerinin toplulaflt›r›lmas›) and discouraged the resettlement of hamlets.
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In 1999, return to villages was recast in terms of the imperative for regional development. 65 Then, in 2000, the National Security Council adopted an "Action Plan for the Eastern and Southeastern Regions" which reportedly targeted the social and economic development of 25 provinces. For the next several years, the RVRP was cited alongside the "Action Plan" by government officials when addressing development in the southeast. In 2001, the GAP Authority commissioned a study on a "Sub-regional Development Plan" (Alt Bölge Geliflme Plan›) as part of the RVRP. The GAP and the State Planning Organization (SPO) wanted to turn the resettlement of evacuated villages into an "opportunity" for rural development through the designing of "central villages" (merkez köy), "centers of attraction" (cazibe merkezi) or "village townships" (köy-kent) -concepts that have existed in rural planning for some time in Turkey. The rationale for this would be not only cost-effectiveness of rural development by avoiding the resettlement of sprawling and low-density hamlets, but also the ease of provision of security. But the study, carried out by a group of social scientists and regional planners in selected rural areas of 11 southeastern provinces, reached a different conclusion. The researchers pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the displaced villagers they surveyed rejected being resettled in a rural area other than their own village or hamlet for various economic, historical and cultural reasons. Therefore, instead of the "concentration of settlements," the study argued for the "concentration of public services" (hizmetlerin toplulaflt›r›lmas›) for clusters of villages. The research thus yielded "models" for concentration of public services.
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However, these sub-regional plans were never implemented.
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The RVRP has continued to this day without any overarching plan or project. Governors allocate in-kind aid to displaced persons according to less than transparent criteria. 69 Thus, the state allowed displaced people to return only after it secured the military control of the rural areas in 1998, and only to those villages that were declared as safe. Military considerations played an important role in the promotion of the goal of development in the southeast, just as they did in the evacuation of rural areas. 73 Development had the goal of revitalizing the regional economy in the wake of the "fight against terror," but the policies implemented in the region have so far only had the practical aim of reversing the negative impact of migration and displacement, namely the increasingly visible urban poverty and destitution. A number of nationwide programs to fight poverty, some adopted with international backing, have been rigorously implemented in the region. For instance in Diyarbak›r, which has become a showcase for government policy in the region, the governor's office and the Social Aid and Solidarity Foundation (SYDV) are very active in reaching out to poor families. Local representatives of the government are proud of the outreach of programs such as free healthcare for the poor (the "Green Card"), income transfers to families who keep their children in school, income transfers to farmers, monetary and in-kind aid to needy families and the campaign to enroll school-age girls in primary education. They concede that a significant segment of the targeted groups are migrants and evicted villagers.
74
Diyarbak›r's governorship and metropolitan municipality have also initiated a number of programs, some in cooperation with local NGOs, to 71 HRW, "Still Critical." Prospects in 2005 for Internally Displaced Kurds in Turkey, in, vol. 17 people and children said they would stay until after the harvest season. Among the 30-40 temporary residents of the village there were no younger men. The elders explained that it would be dangerous for men to stay as the gendarmes had been active in that area recently. See also Ibid. 73 A recent development that would lend support to our claim is the National Security Council's taking up of "internal migration" as a security concern. In a recent meeting, the NSC agreed that the alarming pace of migration to western metropolises from the southeastern and Black Sea regions was the cause behind increasing urban poverty, crime and "social incidents" such as the so-called rehabilitate children working on the streets and to help poor migrant women gain income-earning skills. Significantly, women and children are the primary targets of such projects, some of which have received funding from the EU.
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But so far no overarching regional economic development plan has been designed and fresh investments in the region are still lacking. 76 In some ways, local leaders are looking forward to Turkey's integration with the EU for that promise to be fulfilled. 77 However, the context of the talk of regional development cannot be understood without analyzing the evolution of international responses to forced migration in Turkey. As the international approach to Turkey's IDP problem took shape in the course of its bid for European Union membership, the EU too has prioritized developmental concerns as we discuss below.
International responses to internal displacement in Turkey
While overall the forced displacement in Turkey was ignored and did not trigger significant international action, a number of international organizations attempted to lift the veil of silence on the issue. From 1990 onwards, the Human Rights Watch regularly alerted the international public opinion about forced displacement in Turkey. 78 In 1999, the US Committee for Refugees published a report examining both the process of village evacuations and the situation of the Kurdish IDPs in the cities.
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The London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project published reports and carried the claims of a number of Kurdish IDPs to the ECtHR. 80 In several publications affiliated with the RSG, Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng mentioned Turkey as a critical case of a country that denied the existence of an IDP problem despite its large IDP population. 81 In an article in 1999,
Cohen described Turkey as a "hard case" and a "tough nut to crack" along JCMS 41, no. 3 (2003) .
between Turkey and the EU -which formally began in 1959 -to an unprecedented level of intensity. Turkey embarked on major political and social reforms while the EU acquired more influence on domestic politics. Cultural rights for Kurds and other minorities, the improvement of Turkey's human rights record and other democratic steps were among the political reforms that Turkey promised to undertake in its "National Program" in a bid to secure a date for accession negotiations. The candidacy also entailed Turkey's stronger integration within the international community: after 1999, Turkey signed a number of international human rights conventions and extended awaited invitations to Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission of Human Rights. 88 During the reform process the EU gradually began to address the issue of internal displacement. While the first Accession Partnership Document between the EU and Turkey in 2001 did not mention internal displacement, the revision of the document in 2003 added the return of displaced people to their original settlements (as part of the effort to reduce regional disparities) to its list of priorities. However, the real milestone in this process was the Special Representative Francis Deng's visit to Turkey to examine the IDP situation. Since neither the EU nor the UN Country Team in Turkey had previously a specific policy on internal displacement, Deng's report following his visit provided a framework for these institutions to engage the government more forcefully on this issue. Indeed, after Deng's visit a shift in government policy became apparent when Turkey entered a dialogue with international organizations to take steps to remedy the conditions of IDPs. months later, Deng submitted a report of his mission to the UN Commission on Human Rights with observations and policy recommendations to which most international organizations now refer in their engagement with Turkey's IDP problem. In his report, Deng emphasized that contrary to the negative international perception of the Turkish government as a state denying the existence of displacement and not assisting IDPs, the officials with whom he had met displayed a positive and cooperative attitude in which they acknowledged the existence of internal displacement and expressed willingness for international cooperation. It is apparent from the report that Deng made a strong effort not to alienate the government and focused on the promises given during his visit rather than on the policies of the previous decade. His recommendations and criticism were directed not only at the Turkish government, but the international community as well. He stated that "as a result of the government's apparent sensitivity with regard to the issue, the international community, including the UN agencies in the country avoided open discussion of the problem with the authorities and refrained from providing protection and assistance to those displaced."
91 While Deng related the failure of the international community to its priority not to antagonize the Turkish government, later in the report he pointed also to the unwillingness of UN officials in Turkey to engage with IDPs as a special category: "making a distinction of the displaced and non-displaced populations in the south-east was not a straightforward, practical, or even desirable exercise." 92 Accordingly, the situation of IDPs was not too different from the general population in the southeast that suffered from structural economic underdevelopment and widespread poverty. Thus, the UN country team's approach was similar to that of the government, e.g., preferring to locate the IDP problem in the drastic regional disparities between eastern and western Turkey. In contrast, Deng pointed out to the particular needs of IDPs ranging from psychosocial rehabilitation to education, health and employment. He also criticized the government for focusing on the issues of return and resettlement at the expense of addressing the current conditions of IDPs. Deng's report listed ten recommendations which can be summarized into three sets of tasks: first, he called on the government to collect data to adequately assess the scale of the problem along with the need to address the current condition of the IDPs. Another set of tasks relates to enhanced cooperation with international organizations, in particular with the UN 91 Deng, "Specific Groups and Individuals," 10. 92 Ibid.
country team in Turkey as well as with local NGOs who are in touch with IDPs on a daily basis. A third set of tasks relates to the removal of obstacles for return, such as compensation, mine clearance, abolition of the village guard system and the revision of the role of the security forces in the region. Deng also called upon the UN country team to take an active role in assisting Turkey to implement these recommendations and pointed to the need of financial assistance Turkey would require in this process.
Turkey's Ambassador to the UN criticized the report for portraying "the cause of displacement as the equal responsibility of the terrorist organization and the authorities."
93 Reiterating official policy, he blamed the large portion of displacement to PKK's activities, while "only a small number of settlements had to be evacuated by the relevant authorities to ensure the safety of our people as a precaution." 94 Thus, this response is in line with the government's unwillingness to take responsibility for displacement while at the same time embarking on international dialogue.
IDPs enter the EU accession agenda
The Deng Report was a catalyst for the international community's greater involvement with Turkey's internal displacement problem. Accordingly, the European Commission incorporated the needs of IDPs as described in the Deng Report in its annual "Progress Reports" on Turkey starting in 2002. 95 In the course of the talks between the EU and Turkey regarding accession negotiations, the European Commission increasingly associated the displacement issue with regional development.
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Most telling in this respect is the 2004 EU Progress Report on Turkey, disclosed several months before the European Commission's decision on starting accession negotiations with Turkey. This report described the situation of internally displaced people as "still critical" and stressed that a number of problems needed to be addressed before they could return to their villages. It stated that "[t]he normalization of the situation in the Southeast should be pursued through the return of displaced persons, a The conclusions reached by the European Commission are not surprising since the reduction of regional disparities within Turkey and the reduction of socio-economic disparities between Turkey and the EU are the two basic goals of the negotiation process for Turkey's possible membership to the Union. What is noteworthy however is that there is a convergence between Turkey's position on this issue maintained since the late 1990s and that of the EU. According to MFA officials, the EU and the UN initially raised the possibility of an aid program for the internally displaced people, but Turkey argued against this on the grounds that it would be discriminatory towards the rest of the population in the region. 100 Officers of the European Commission Representation in Ankara expressed a similar position. Any future EU fund for a socio-economic program for the Southeast would not target only the IDPs but would have a regional perspective. 101 Furthermore, although the situation of the IDPs was mentioned under the rubric of political criteria in EU reports on Turkey, the demands were not expressed in terms of the restitution of rights. Since the state says it evacuated villages for security reasons, ostensibly, it could claim that it was not violating their rights but protecting them. Therefore, the EU worded its demands in terms of return and resettlement and regional development, not human rights. was officially launched. Later in the same month, the "law on compensation of damages arising from terror and the fight against terror" (law no. 5233) was passed by the parliament. But further actions recommended in the Deng Report such as mine clearance, abolition of the village guard system, a greater role for national NGOs, and a revision of the role of the security forces in the region have not yet occurred.
In a nutshell, in the process of talks, the UN and the EU tacitly agreed to Turkey's tackling the situation of internally displaced people without publicly naming the problem 103 or accepting its responsibility in displacing people. Hence, the activities and documents that these talks yielded used the language of return to villages and more generally that of development rather than the restitution of rights. We should also point out that the emphasis laid in the Deng report on addressing the current conditions of IDPs rather than exclusively focusing on return and resettlement also seems to have been overlooked in the course of the talks.
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The "social state" promises to compensate damages
The compensation law is worthy of some discussion here not only because it was passed in response to the EU demands, but more importantly, since it frames the restitution of rights in a pecuniary language and thus contributes to the state's ongoing evasion of its responsibility for evicting people. 105 In explaining its rationale, the preamble of law no. 5233 refers to the constitutional clause that the Turkish Republic is "a social state based on the rule of law" (sosyal hukuk devleti) and maintains that the "damages resulting from terror and the fight against terror" will be compensated within the framework of the "social risk" principle based on "objective responsibility." 106 It then states that, being part of the EU harmonization Kanun," no. 5233, July 17, 2004 , Resmi Gazete, no. 25535 (July 27, 2004 . The regulation implementing the law was issued in October 2004 ("Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Do¤an Zararlar›n Karfl›lanmas› Hakk›nda Yönetmelik," implementing law no. 5233, October 4, 2004 , Resmi Gazete, no. 25619 (October 20, 2004 . 106 The Preamble of the law states that although the juridical responsibility of the administration is based on the "principle of fault," in exceptional situations, "damages that the administration could not prevent although it was responsible for doing so should be covered without searching for a causal link or the principle of fault. This is called the principle of social risk based on an understanding of objective responsibility" (translation ours package, this piece of legislation aims to prevent further applications to the ECtHR and for these applications to be a source of "unjust enrichment"
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The law rules that compensation will be awarded for losses resulting from physical damages to houses and agricultural and commercial property as well as losses resulting from lack of access to such incomebearing property through "peaceful means" (sulh yolu), that is, by mutual agreement between the applicants and the provincial committees, which will determine the value of the damages. 109 The awarded amount can be rejected by the applicant and is open to litigation. But the compensation of non-pecuniary damages suffered by individuals (manevi tazminat) is not mentioned in the law. More significantly, the law establishes an indirect link with the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project. On one hand, the value of past in-kind or monetary aid for returnees under the RVRP will be deducted from the awarded amount. On the other hand, the regulation explicitly states that in-kind compensation (such as building materials or housing projects) should be given priority over cash payments wherever possible. 110 As such, the law's spirit is not one of restitution of violated rights, but one of economic reparation.
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From denial to regulation
Over the course of ten years, the Turkish state has moved from a position of complete denial to selective regulation of the consequences of internal displacement under international pressure. However, the UN's "soft" IDP regime could not bring about this change of position on its own. Only when accession to EU membership became a foreign policy priority did Turkey agree to take steps towards tackling post-displacement problems. Currently, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Office in tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem22/til01/ss650m.htm. 107 Ibid. 108 In friendly settlements reached between the state and the evicted villagers at the ECtHR, Turkey has agreed to pay damages based on the same principle, that is, "objective responsibility" (Interview a lawyer from ‹stanbul representing displaced persons from Tunceli on February 26, 2004). 109 The law also rules the payment of pecuniary compensation to the families of persons who were killed and to persons who were injured or handicapped in the course of the fight against terror ("Terör ve Terörle Mücadele Kanunu"). As such, the law is meant to cover all civilian losses suffered in the course of the war, and not just the damages of displaced people. However, the largest number of applications will come from IDPs (Interview with a vice-governor in Diyarbak›r on February 2, 2005). 110 "Terör ve Terörle Mücadele Yönetmeli¤i." 111 In fact, the wording of the law is designed to avoid any talk about rights or faulty actions of the state.
The provincial committees that handle the applications are formed of local government officials; the only non-governmental member is the representative of the provincial bar association. Furthermore, the burden of proof rests with the applicants for producing evidence that the damages to their property resulted from the fight against terror rather than due to wear and tear (Interview with the migration coordinator of the Diyarbak›r Bar Association on February 4, 2004).
Ankara -with tacit agreement of the European Commission -provides consultation to and monitors the Turkish government departments coordinating IDP-related activities. The Hacettepe University study which will be completed in 2006 is the first product of this international collaboration. The study's goals are to make a quantitative estimate of the number of IDPs by analyzing available statistical sources and to determine the problems, expectations and the return tendencies of displaced people with the help of a large-scale survey. The findings of the research will help shape policies and projects for rural development and rehabilitation of evacuated villages in the southeast. 112 Therefore, tangible projects for development in the southeast and the improvement of the conditions of IDPs, partly to be funded by the EU, will not be on the table before 2006. Although such projects have not materialized yet, what is significant for our purposes here is the ongoing construction of a policy discourse centered on development as a remedy for IDPs' plight. Our argument is that such a policy discourse attempts to regulate the consequences of internal displacement as perceived by international and national authorities rather than find durable solutions to a problem rooted in political conflict. As such, the diversity of the aspirations of IDPs has not been taken into account so far, either. In what follows, we seek to demonstrate this argument through a nuanced reading of the critical forced migration literature discussed at the outset of the essay. As mentioned before, the existing literature argues that international humanitarian organizations tend to regulate displaced populations by constructing depolitized discourses, categories and policies. What we would like to emphasize here is that even in the absence of international intervention, a discourse propagated by the state can result in a comparable situation. The Turkish IDP problem, distinguished by the authorities' unique mode of dealing with it as well as the state's longstanding position on the Kurdish issue, occasioned a particular set of policy practices, recently backed up by international institutions, which then pose a number of problems as we discuss below.
Deployment of Regulatory Categories: More than ten years after the majority of the displacements occurred, the belated inclusion of the international community in the policy-making process on IDPs is unlikely to create the same kinds of control over them that often happens in the course of providing humanitarian aid in refugee and IDP camps. Still, there are some immediate impacts of the emerging international collaboration on Turkey's IDPs, such as the adoption of "imported" terminology. We see with reducing regional disparities in development is also partly related to this. As for the UN, voluntary return to original homes is one of the primary ways in which the Guiding Principles foresee an end to internal displacement, although the feasibility of this option is increasingly coming into question. Turkey's approach to tackling the problem also prioritizes returns, as in the examples of the RVRP and the compensation law, and the implicit connection between the two. However, two caveats are in order here. Firstly, it is unclear if the Turkish state is sincerely committed to the resettlement of vacant rural areas in the southeast. Some villages are still not open to returning villagers due to security reasons, and the resettlement of hamlets is discouraged. 117 The continued existence of the village guard system and landmines are critical hurdles preventing many IDPs from returning to their homes, issues also raised in the last EU Progress Report. 118 The government has officially adopted "return to villages" as the solution to the displacement problem and is desperate to show to the international community that returns are strong and steady; nevertheless its policies fall short of fulfilling this goal. The doubts raised about the number of returnees -120,000 according to official figures -by domestic and international NGOs should also be seen in this light. 119 But secondly, domestic NGOs also focus on return and resettlement, thereby suggesting that IDPs would rather go home if given the chance. For some Kurdish politicians who view forced displacement as a systematic project to depopulate rural Kurdish regions, return to original homes has been a major political demand as well. Therefore, there is a need to go behind the surface level of the prevalent discourse and carefully delineate what "return" to original homes means for different people. For instance, for many IDPs who were forcefully evicted, "returning home" might have more than a simple signification. At one level, returning home is returning to the homeland. As such, it is a widely shared political demand by Kurdish IDPs for the removal of the violation of the right to live in one's homeland. But at another level, returning home is an important decision about livelihood, which may depend on a variety of factors. Indeed, our interviews with forced migrants in ‹stanbul and Diyarbak›r, albeit not based on a representative sample, But the EU insists on the signing of this agreement, probably as a symbol of Turkey's commitment not to produce asylum seekers in the future. The agreement has been delayed so far because of the war and change of regime in Iraq. demonstrate the diversity of their aspirations based on age, gender and location. Only elderly people and men expressed a firm wish to return to their villages. Young adults of both genders and married women, on the other hand, saw their future in the city. For instance, in ‹stanbul, young working men and women did not want to go back to the village since they were unaccustomed to rural life. Yet they wanted their villages to be rebuilt for visits during summer. Furthermore, unmarried women saw the social life in villages and small towns as very restrictive. Their most significant aspirations were about education -from taking literacy courses to getting a high school diploma -and finding better jobs. In Diyarbak›r, likewise, both single teenage and married women said they preferred to stay in the city. What they demanded most immediately from the government and local politicians were steady employment opportunities. These responses demonstrate that a single-track policy based on return and resettlement is likely to miss the diversity of the needs, problems and aspirations of the multitude of IDPs. Although it is crucial that destroyed rural areas be reconstructed and villages be opened for return, an exclusive focus on returns continues to sidestep the need for making policies for urban-dwelling IDPs, some of whom may never permanently go back to their rural homes.
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Sidestepping Political Issues: Moreover, IDPs who wish to go back home do not consider this to be possible under existing conditions. Even if a regional development program that would revitalize evacuated rural areas goes into effect in the next few years, a host of vital issues have still not been addressed by state authorities; nor has the EU or the UN pressured Turkey to do so. The most important one is the root cause of the displacement itself: the Kurdish conflict. After the military victory of the Turkish army over the PKK in 1998, the armed clashes slowed down, yet the in the absence of a political solution, the Kurdish issue continues to linger on. Since the summer of 2004, the noticeable increase in the number of armed clashes in the Southeast and more recently, a series of nationalistic outbreaks demonstrate the volatility of this stagnant stage. In this sense, the developmental discourse shared by the government, the EU and the UN is highly problematic because it disentangles the forced displacement of Kurds from the Kurdish conflict itself. In our interviews, some IDPs mentioned their fear of renewed armed clashes and military operations as the reasons why they would not return to their village before there is 120 However, a positive caveat is in order here. If the Hacettepe University study produces findings which indicate that permanent returns to evacuated villages will be low, this might be a useful feedback for future policy-making. 
Concluding remarks
By avoiding addressing the causes and history of displacement, the developmental discourse circumvents issues of core aspects of postconflict peace-building such as reconciliation, justice and accountability. While the government has taken initiatives to remedy the situation of IDPs, it has done so without a public acknowledgement of its responsibility. Re-establishing trust between IDPs and the state remains an urgent task. The Representative for the Human Rights of IDPs, Walter Kälin, recently emphasized that remedies which states "owe to victims of human rights violations are not limited to 'rehabilitation, restitution, compensation and repair' but also include 'satisfaction' (which includes an element of justice, such as full disclosure, apology, and, particularly, imposition of judicial and administrative sanctions on those responsible)." 125 The policy discourse arising from the international collaboration among the government, the EU and the UN tacitly circumvents such concerns. The international dialogue still proceeds at a diplomatic level far away from an open and public discussion that should include the IDPs themselves. Ten years after the internal displacement of Kurds in Turkey, the belated awakening of the government and the international community is an important step to improve the livelihoods of the Kurdish IDPs. However, the emerging policy discourse has important shortcomings and fails to address key issues pertinent to the IDP problem in Turkey. As long as postdisplacement problems are handled in a depoliticized manner while a solution to the Kurdish conflict continues to be postponed, return, resettlement, rehabilitation and "satisfaction" might remain elusive goals. What is more, displacement may even reoccur if the armed conflict intensifies again.
